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Several studies report changes in risk taking subsequent to experiencing near-loss events. We 
disentangle strategic and non-strategic reactions to such near-losses experimentally. We observe 
that near-losses affect the supply and demand for insurance under strategic uncertainty but not 
individual evaluations. 
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1 Introduction 
The decision to insure against potential disasters results at least partially from whether decision 
makers have “nearly averted” personal damage previously. Kunreuther et al. (1978) presented 
field data suggesting that individuals who experience events in which, by good fortune, no flood 
damage is incurred, subsequently increase their willingness to take risks by allowing insurance 
policies to lapse. More recently, similar reactions to near-losses are reported in vignette studies 
on space missions (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008), cyber-attacks (Rosoff et al., 2013) and flood and 
hurricane risks (Dillon et al., 2011).   
The cost of insuring against a loss is usually determined by supply and demand in a market. Since 
most markets are not perfectly competitive, strategic incentives will arise. If near-losses do not 
reveal new information about the size of the loss or its likelihood, rational market participants 
will have no reason to adjust their evaluations of the respective insurance. Their strategic bids or 
asks are also expected to remain unaffected, as long as the rationality of the market participants is 
common knowledge. If common knowledge is absent, however, the belief that the bids or asks of 
others may change after observing a near-loss will be enough to change bids or asks (or the belief 
that others believe that someone’s bids or asks may change, or that others believe that someone 
believes that someone’s bids or asks may change, and so on). The previous literature does not 
consider such strategic uncertainty even though it has been shown to be crucial for interaction in 
markets (see for example Crawford and Iriberri, 2007, and Charness and Levin, 2009, on auction 
behavior).  
In our experiment we aim to disentangle non-strategic reactions to near-losses from reactions that 
are driven by strategic uncertainty. We confront subjects with a lottery gamble that may lead to a 
sizeable loss. There is transparency with regard to the size and the likelihood of the loss. We eli-
cit valuations for insurance that protects subjects from the potential loss using the incentive-
compatible BDM mechanism (Becker et al., 1964), which is commonly used to elicit evaluations 
of insurance contracts (see Jaspersen, 2016, for a survey). We compare these evaluations to bids 
and asks for the insurance in an open-book call market. 
Prices for the insurance in the BDM mechanism are determined by a bid from a random number 
generator, while prices in the call market are the result of asks and bids chosen by other human 
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market participants. As in the BDM mechanism, bids and asks in the call market will be driven 
by each individual’s evaluation of the insurance. In the call market, however, they are also influ-
enced by strategic uncertainty about the behavior of other market participants. Comparing risk 
taking in both conditions allows us to identify the effect of strategic uncertainty on the reactions 
to near-losses. We also run an open-book version of the BDM mechanism. As in the call market, 
there is the potential for social influence among market participants but there is no strategic un-
certainty. 
Recent experimental studies on asset markets have revealed that a lack of common knowledge 
about rationality drives the mispricing of assets. Cheung et al. (2014) observe that mispricing is 
substantially reduced if market participants know that all market participants have been trained 
extensively on the nature of the fundamental value. Training itself, however, does not affect mi-
spricing. Akiyama et al. (2017) also study behavior in experimental asset markets. They compare 
the behavior of individuals facing other human traders to the behavior of individuals facing com-
puterized traders known to behave rationally. They conclude that 50 percent of the observed mi-
spricing was driven by strategic uncertainty caused by human traders. In an incentivized experi-
ment conducted in parallel to our study, Wu et al. (2017) observe less risk-averse behavior after 
near-losses in a non-strategic betting task. Like Wu et al. (2017), we use a roulette wheel to pro-
vide participants with event cues and for resolving uncertainty (see also Kahneman and Varey, 
1990, for an early discussion).  
2 Experimental design  
In the experiment insurance contracts against the lottery X could be traded in rounds t = 1, …, 18. 
The binary lottery pays -18 experimental currency units (ECU) with a probability of 1/18 and 0 
otherwise. This lottery was depicted as a roulette wheel in the experiment shown in Figure 1 (see 
the Appendix for complete instructions): one field yields a loss of 18 ECU while the other 17 
fields do not influence payoffs. After each round the outcome of the lottery was determined by an 
animated wheel spin (as depicted) that highlighted which field was selected in a particular round. 
The loss event occurred when the wheel stopped on the black field. A near-loss event was opera-





Figure 1 – Roulette wheel with 18 fields 
 
 
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned the role of a buyer or seller. 
In each round, sellers were endowed with an insurance contract against the lottery, while buyers 
were not. The lottery had an expected payoff of -1 ECU which is equal to the fair value of the 
insurance contract. Each round started with an actuarially equal distribution of endowments: buy-
ers were endowed with 26 ECU and sellers with 25 ECU. Across treatments buyers stated the 
highest price for which they were willing to buy insurance (“bid”) and sellers stated the lowest 
price for which they were willing to sell insurance (“ask”). Once a trade was implemented the 
price was subtracted from the buyer’s endowment and added to the endowment of the respective 
seller. Subjects could hold at most one insurance contract. Those who did not hold a contract at 
the end of a round had to play the lottery, and any resulting loss was subtracted from their payoff 
for that round. At the end of the experiment one round was randomly determined for payment and 
ECU were converted to Euros at a rate of ECU 1 to Euro 0.80.  
Table 1 summarizes the treatments. In two treatments we used the incentive-compatible BDM 
mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). In theory, this mechanism truthfully elicits the individual wil-
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lingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) of buyers and sellers.
1
 More specifical-
ly, in the two BDM treatments, BDM and BDM-O, subjects had to enter the highest price for 
which they would buy insurance or the lowest price for which they would sell the insurance. 
These values were elicited using a list of potential prices, as in Bartling et al. (2015). Subjects 
were informed that one of the prices would be selected randomly as the clearing price. Buyers 
would buy the insurance if their stated bid was higher or equal to this price. Sellers would sell the 
insurance if the ask was equal to or below this price. The two BDM treatments were framed as a 
market interaction, but buyers and sellers submitted their values in the BDM mechanism private-
ly and the outcome was determined independently for everyone. Participants in the BDM treat-
ment were not informed about the actions of other participants. In the BDM-O treatment subjects 
were informed at the end of each round about the bids and asks entered by the other subjects in a 
matching group. Subjects in this treatment interacted in groups of eight market participants 
(without re-matching), equally divided into buyers and sellers. The feedback provided meant that 
this represented an “open-book” version of the BDM mechanism.  
In the CM-O treatment we implemented the open-book call market (Arifovic and Ledyard, 
2007). In this treatment participants also interacted in groups of eight market participants. Bids 
and asks were collected as sealed-bids and the market price was determined by maximizing the 
feasible number of trades in each round. As in the BDM-O treatment, participants were informed 
about all bids and asks in their market after each round. Note that bids and asks are the result of 
strategic interaction in this treatment, and cannot be regarded as willingness-to-pay or willing-
ness-to-accept measures. Nevertheless, we can compare the adjustments of bids in BDM, BDM-
O and CM-O over time. 
All subjects participating in one matching group faced the same lottery realizations. Two orders 
of independent lottery realizations were used across treatments. On average, each subject expe-
rienced two near-losses and one loss in total.  
Sessions lasted for 90 minutes at most and subjects earned 19.93 Euros on average. They were 
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The eight sessions were conducted at the Essen Laboratory 
                                                 
1
 Since the lottery we consider has a negative expected value, buyers buy insurance and state their willingness-to-pay 
(WTP), while sellers state their willingness-to-accept (WTA) (see Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989, for a similar word-
ing). Of course, referring buyers of the insurance as “sellers of the lottery” would be equivalent. 
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for Experimental Economics (elfe) using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In each session we con-
ducted all three treatments at a time and participants were randomly assigned to treatments.  
 
Table 1 - Treatments 
Treatment Price determination Feedback Rounds Matching groups N 
BDM BDM list None 18 - 32 
BDM-O BDM list Order book 18 8 64 
CM-O Call market Order book 18 8 64 
 
3 Results 
In accordance with an endowment effect which is frequently observed in experimental studies 
(for studies involving lotteries see, e.g., Knetsch and Sinden, 1984, Eisenberger and Weber, 1995, 
Schmidt and Traub, 2009), buyers’ average bid (2.219) was higher than sellers’ average ask 
(4.048). In line with risk aversion, the average bids and asks were significantly larger than one 
(the fair price of the insurance) in all three treatments (p≤0.030, two-sided Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks tests). The average ask is 0.427 ECU higher in BDM than in CM-O (p=0.037, 
two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test). There were no other significant differences in bids or asks be-
tween treatments (p≥0.159). 
If subjects adjust their individual evaluations of the insurance after near-loss or loss events, we 
should observe a change in buyers’ bids and sellers’ asks in all treatments. If changes are due to 
strategic considerations, they should only occur in the treatment with market interaction, CM-O.  
Figure 2 shows the deviation in bids and asks after near-loss and loss events compared to the av-
erage bid or ask in rounds not following a near-loss or loss event. We observe a significant in-
crease in buyers’ bids in CM-O of 0.256 ECU after experiencing near-loss events, indicating a 
decrease in risk taking (p=0.025, two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests). Similar-
ly, sellers exhibit weakly significantly less risk taking by stating asks which are on average 0.141 
ECU higher after near-loss events (p=0.068). We do not find significant changes in risk taking 
behavior in BDM and BDM-O (p≥0.162). After observing a loss, only buyers in CM-O de-
creased their bids weakly significantly (p=0.093). Although the change in bids is not significant 
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for buyers in BDM-O (p=0.263), its tendency is again similar to that in CM-O. Other subjects 
did not adjust their bids or asks following a loss (p≥0.461). 
 
  
a. Deviation from average bid after near-loss events    b. Deviation from average ask after near-loss events 
 
 c. Deviation from average bid after loss event d. Deviation from average ask after loss event 
Figure 2 – Deviation from average bids or asks  
after near-loss and loss events with 90% confidence intervals 
 
We also run separate fixed effects panel regressions for buyers and sellers in each treatment. We 
assume that buyers i in a matching group j state their bid in round t according to 
 bidit = β0 + β1pricej,t-1 + β2near_lossj,t-1 + β3lossj,t-1 + αi + εit.  (1) 
The bidding function contains the last round’s price (pricej,t-1) which may serve as an anchor for 
bidding in the current round t. The two dummy variables near_lossj,t-1 and lossj,t-1 take the value 1 
if buyers and sellers in market j experienced a near-loss event or loss event, respectively, in the 
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last round and 0 otherwise. Idiosyncratic errors εit are assumed to be independently and identical-
ly distributed. We apply the same model for sellers’ asks and only replace each “bid” with “ask” 
in (1). Table 2 shows the results. 
 
Table 2 – Regressions for buyers’ bids and sellers’ asks 
  Buyer    Seller  
 BDM BDM-O CM-O  BDM BDM-O CM-O 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
pricej,t-1 0.014 0.007 0.090**  0.030 0.055** 0.016 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.041)  (0.020) (0.022) (0.051) 
near_lossj,t-1 -0.149 0.168 0.233**  0.084 0.044 0.137* 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.095)  (0.084) (0.052) (0.075) 
lossj,t-1 0.093 -0.294* -0.259  0.028 -0.009 0.034 
 (0.092) (0.168) (0.186)  (0.122) (0.080) (0.102) 
Constant 2.004*** 2.400*** 2.106***  4.147*** 3.758*** 3.756*** 
 (0.091) (0.065) (0.138)  (0.052) (0.048) (0.171) 
        
Observations 272 544 544  272 544 544 
Number of subjects 16 32 32  16 32 32 
F-test 1.165 1.674 3.376  3.740 3.030 1.285 
Prob>F 0.356 0.193 0.0307  0.0345 0.0441 0.297 
BIC 433.7 1508 1160  295.8 978.5 1212 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Consistent with our non-parametric tests, regressions show an increase in bids and asks – or a 
decrease in risk taking – after experiencing near-loss events in CM-O, but not for buyers’ and 
sellers’ evaluations in BDM and BDM-O. This suggests that the strategic uncertainty of the mar-
ket environment drives behavioral responses to experiencing near-loss events. The increase in 
average bids subsequent to near-losses is in fact significantly greater for buyers in CM-O than in 
BDM (p=0.006, two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test). Since there are no significant differences be-
tween CM-O and BDM-O (p=0.528), however, the decrease in risk taking in CM-O may be at 
least in part attributable to feedback about other bids and asks in the market (see, e.g., Trautmann 
and Vieider, 2012, for a survey on social influences on risk taking). 
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The tendency for less risk taking following a near-loss in CM-O appears to contradict previous 
work by Dillon and Tinsley (2008) as well as by Tinsley et al. (2012), who observe an increase in 
risk taking subsequent to experiencing near-loss events. However, studies conducted in these 
papers are substantially different as they rely on hypothetical, vignette-based decision scenarios 
and do not consider social influences or strategic uncertainty.
2
 Taking this into account, our find-
ings are broadly consistent with previous results by Wu et al. (2017). Focusing only on individual 
decisions, the authors also employ an incentivized task using a roulette wheel. They observe 
more risk-averse behavior if the roulette wheel stops just before the loss and less risk-averse be-
havior if it stops just after the loss. The near-losses in our experiment resemble their “before 
near-loss” conditions. This was not a conscious design-choice but resulted from the specific time-
series of random spins generated in our experiment.  
4 Conclusion 
To our knowledge we present the first study analyzing near-loss events using the tools of experi-
mental economics. Our experiment reveals that strategic uncertainty influences risk taking subse-
quent to experiencing near-losses. In our setting, we do not observe a significant effect from near-
losses on individual evaluations of insurances as measured using the BDM mechanism. However, 
we observe an increase in bids for insurances and – to a smaller degree – an increase in asks in a 
call market with strategic uncertainty. It is important to note that this effect may also be influ-
enced by competitiveness or other aspects that are specific to a market setting, however. Al-
though not significant, we find a tendency for a similar effect when allowing for social influences 
among participants when eliciting individual evaluations using the BDM mechanism. This find-
ing suggests that also social information may contribute to the decrease in risk taking we observe 
in the call market.   
                                                 
2
 Moreover, Tinsley et al. (2012) distinguish between two types of events: Near-loss events that almost happened 
may increase the perceived vulnerability of a system and, hence, lead to less risk taking, whereas near-loss events 
that could have but did not happen may increase the perceived resilience of a system and, hence, result in more risk 
taking. It remains speculative, however, whether the near-loss event in our study was indeed interpreted by our sub-
jects as an event that “almost happened”. 
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Appendix: Instructions (translated from German) 




You are taking part in an experiment about decision making. During the experiment you and the 
other participants will be asked to make decisions. By doing so, you can earn money. How much 
you are about to earn depends on your decisions. After the experiment you will receive your earn-
ings in cash.  
None of the participants will receive any information concerning the identity of other par-




Please read the following instructions carefully. Approximately five minutes after you have re-
ceived the instructions, we will come to your desk to answer any remaining questions. Should 
you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand. We will then come to your 
desk to answer them. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment consists of 18 rounds. One of these rounds will be randomly selected at the end 
of the experiment to determine your payoff. In each round you own an amount of money that can 
be reduced by participating in a lottery. You always have to participate in the lottery but you can 
insure yourself against the potential loss of a round. If you are insured, you will not suffer a loss 
through the lottery of this round in any case. 
At the beginning of the experiment it will be randomly determined whether you participate as a 
buyer or seller. In each round the sellers own a budget of 25 experimental currency units (ECU) 
and one insurance policy. The buyers own a budget of 26 ECU and no insurance policy. If the 
lottery results in a loss, it reduces the budget of each participant not owning an insurance policy 
by 18 ECU. 
One round consists of a trading phase and a lottery phase. In the trading phase insurance policies 




At the beginning of each round insurance policies against a loss from the lottery can be traded on 
a market. Sellers own one insurance policy each at the beginning of a round. In the trading phase 
12 
they have to state whether they would sell their insurance policy at various potential price levels. 
Buyers do not own an insurance policy at the beginning of a round. In the trading phase they have 
to state whether they would buy an insurance policy at various price levels. 
[BDM/BDM-O: In each round a new market price is drawn randomly from the interval 0 ECU to 
5 ECU (including the values of 0 ECU and of 5 ECU). So note that you cannot influence the 
market price through your decisions.] 
[BDM-O/CM-O: In each round you and seven other experiment participants will form a group 
consisting of four buyers and four sellers. The constellation of the group is determined randomly 
and remains the same for all rounds.] [CM-O: The market price is based on the lowest acceptable 
prices of sellers and on the highest acceptable prices of buyers. It is determined so that the largest 
possible number of insurance policies is traded between the buyers and sellers of your group. 
This happens under the condition that each participant can only own one insurance policy at the 
end of the trading phase. So note that you can influence the market price of your group through 
your decisions. (In the info-box on the last two pages of these instructions you will find further 
information about how exactly the market price is determined.)] 
 
At the end of the trading phase you will be shown the market price. A trade will be realized if you 
have stated that you would buy or, respectively, sell an insurance policy at this price. 
 
[BDM-O/CM-O: Also you will be shown an overview of the lowest acceptable prices of the four 
sellers and the highest acceptable prices of the four buyers in your group (ordered by size).] 
 
Lottery phase 
In the lottery phase a lottery will determine whether a loss occurs in each round, respectively. For 
this, a wheel of fortune such as the one in the figure below will be spun. The wheel of fortune has 
18 fields, 1 black and 17 white. The wheel of fortune randomly stops at one of these 18 fields 
with each field being equally likely. 
If the wheel of fortunes stops with a white field at the top, no loss occurs. That means the loss 
from the lottery is 0 ECU. If the wheel of fortune stops with a black field at the top, a loss 18 
ECU occurs. The loss from the lottery is only relevant for experimental participants who do not 





After the lottery phase, the profits from a round will be calculated as follows: 
- for a seller with insurance policy: 25 ECU 
- for a seller without insurance policy: 25 ECU + market price – loss from the lottery 
- for a buyer with insurance policy: 26 ECU – market price 
- for a buyer without insurance policy: 26 ECU – loss from the lottery 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 18 rounds will be chosen at random and you will be paid 
the profit that round. 1 ECU amounts to 0.80 Euro. Payments are rounded to 0.10 Euro. 
 
Before the first round you will participate in a short comprehension test. If you have any 




[CM-O: Further information on the determination of the market price 
For calculating the market price all highest acceptable prices of buyers and all lowest acceptable 
prices of sellers will be determined first. They will then be ordered according to their size. If the 
highest acceptable price of all buyers is above the lowest acceptable price of all sellers, the re-
spective buyer and the respective seller trade. If the second highest acceptable price of buyers is 
above the second lowest acceptable price of sellers, both market participants trade as well. The 
same principle applies to the third and fourth buyer-seller-pair. 
So the total number of traded insurance policies is equal to the number of highest acceptable 
prices of buyers that are above lowest acceptable prices of sellers. Accordingly, in the market 
with four buyers and fours sellers at most four insurance policies can change hands. 
If none of the highest acceptable prices of buyers is above the lowest acceptable prices of sellers, 
no trade takes place and there is no market price.  
If all of the highest acceptable prices of buyers are above the lowest acceptable prices of sellers, 
all insurance policies will change hands. Then the market price is the average of both acceptable 
prices of the last trading buyer-seller-pair. 
If one, two or three of the highest acceptable prices of buyers are above the lowest acceptable 
prices of sellers, one, two or three insurance policies will change hands. In this case, the market 
price will be determined as the average of the following two values: 
(i) The lower of the following two values: The highest acceptable price of the last successful 
buyer and the lowest acceptable price of the first seller, who did not get to trade. 
(ii) The higher of the following two values: The lowest acceptable price of the last successful 
seller and the highest acceptable price of the first buyer, who did not get to trade. 
Example:  
 
The highest acceptable prices of the four buyers are  
 4.00 2.00 0.25 0.00 
The lowest acceptable prices of the four sellers are  
 0.00 0.75 1.75 3.00 
In this case two insurance policies will be traded: First the pair with 4.00 and 0.00 trades and then 
the pair with 2.00 and 0.75. In the first buyer-seller-pair that does not trade, the buyer has a high-
est acceptable price of 0.25 and the seller has a lowest acceptable price of 1.75. 
The market price is then determined as follows:  
(i) The relevant value is 1.75 because 1.75 is lower than 2.00. 
(ii) The relevant value is 0.75 because 0.75 is higher than 0.25.  
The mean value from (i) and (ii) and therefore the market price is (1.75 + 0.75)/2 = 2.50/2 = 1.25.  
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The following diagram shows the highest acceptable prices of buyers and the smallest acceptable 












If there are multiple buyers entering the same highest acceptable price, it is determined randomly 
who of them trades first. In the same way, it is randomly determined which seller trades first, if 
multiple sellers enter the same lowest acceptable price. ] 
 
 
 
 
